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SUMMARY:
... Rising urban and environmental demand for water has created growing pressure to re-allocate water from traditional
agricultural uses. ... In collecting data on water transfers, we recorded every transfer in the WS from January 1987
through December 2005 in twelve western states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico,
Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and Washington. ... By our rules-of-thumb, we classified a use as agricultural
if the name of the lessor, lessee, seller, or buyer was an irrigator, an irrigation district, an agricultural user, a farmer, a
ranch, a canal company, a ditch company, or an individual. ... When a party was a water conservation or conservancy
district, we designated the transfer as an agricultural, an urban, or a combination agriculture-and-urban exchange, not as
environmental. ... An example of an exchange would be a developer agreeing to give a portion of his water right to the
city and in exchange the city would allow the developer to connect his development to city utilities, such as a transfer
for taps. ... As for the data, the number of water transfers and the amount of water transferred highly correlate over
time. ...
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HIGHLIGHT:
Rising urban and environmental demand for water has created growing pressure to re-allocate water from
traditional agricultural uses. Water markets are powerful institutions for facilitating this re-allocation, yet the evolution
of water markets has been more complicated than those for other resources. In this paper, we set the context for water
marketing with an overview of western water law that highlights unique aspects of water law that affect how or whether
a water market can develop. Second, we present new, comprehensive data on the extent, nature, and timing of water
transfers across 12 western states from 1987-2005. We describe the methodology and decision rules used to collect
water transfer information. Third, we identify water market trends and movements to provide a greater understanding of
the institutional structure and the mechanisms by which water is transferred in the American West.
Introduction
In the United States, we use a huge amount of water to grow heavily subsidized cotton and alfalfa feed. n1 Irrigation
systems, often primitive earthen canals, may lose forty to fifty percent of the water diverted into them through seepage
into the ground. n2 Once the water reaches farms, many farmers use highly inefficient flood irrigation or sprinkler
systems that direct water into the air, where much of it evaporates. In California's Imperial Valley, almost one million
acre-feet ("maf") of the three maf diverted by the Imperial Irrigation District ends up as wastewater flowing into the
Salton Sea. n3 Farmers irrigate millions of acres of marginal land despite the lack of high value crops or substantial
profit yields because the farmers have the right to irrigate and may not have the right to do anything else with the water.
Under the doctrine of salvage, a farmer who conserves water may lose the right to it, n4 and a farmer who does not use
the water may lose the right to it through the doctrines of abandonment or forfeiture. n5
As a result, farmers continue to use roughly eighty percent of each state's water, n6 even though other users might
find a significantly more profitable use for it. In California, an acre-foot used in the semiconductor industry produces $
980,000 in gross state revenue; that same acre-foot used to grow cotton and alfalfa generates sixty dollars. n7 Such
disparities of value in the use of a resource beckon calls for the reallocation of water from lower-value to higher-value
activities through water marketing - voluntary agreements between willing sellers and buyers. n8 The quickest way to
reform agricultural water use in the United States is to give farmers a financial incentive to use less: that is, let them sell
the water to thirsty cities.
Water marketing is of more than academic interest. The reality is that the United States is facing a water crisis. n9
There is a disconnect between supply and demand, as population surges upward and our water supplies remain finite.
n10 In the past when we needed more water, we diverted a river, built a dam or drilled a well. With a few exceptions,
these options are no longer viable due to engineering, economic, and environmental objections. n11 Our options for
obtaining new supplies of water are limited, and we must recognize that we are entering an era of water reallocation, a
time when new supplies will necessarily be met by existing users using less. If we want to save our environment from
further degradation, we should embrace water marketing.
In theory, it should be easy to achieve this reallocation. The value to and the price paid by municipal and industrial
users dwarfs that paid by farmers. For instance, groundwater for farming near Marana, Pima County, Arizona costs
approximately twenty-seven dollars per acre-foot (approximately 325,000 gallons), whereas the same water supplied by
Tucson Water, with an increasing block rate structure, will cost customers from $ 479 to $ 3,267 per acre-foot. n12 In
recent efforts to secure Imperial Irrigation District water, San Diego offered $ 258 per acre-foot for water that farmers in
the Imperial Irrigation District paid fifteen or twenty dollars. n13 Even more dramatically, while farmers in the Imperial
Irrigation District paid $ 13.50 per acre-foot in 2001, a development near the South Rim of Grand Canyon National
Park was prepared to spend $ 20,000 per acre-foot for the same Colorado River water. n14
The economic theory of institutional change suggests that with such opportunities for trade, water law and related
legal institutions will respond by lowering the transaction costs of transferring water from agriculture. n15 In this
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process, property rights institutions are particularly important. Most economists agree that an efficient system of
property rights requires three elements: a complete definition; exclusivity; and transferability. n16 Despite these
theoretical predictions, however, water markets appear to be developing more slowly than theory would suggest.
The gap between theory and reality raises several questions. First, how much water marketing is taking place?
Second, are some states more receptive to water marketing than are others? If so, what variables - economic, social, or
legal - account for differences between and among the states? Third, has the legal system responded as the economics
literature predicts to lower the transaction costs to transferring water? If not, why not? Finally, might empirical
analysis shed light on these questions?
In 2003, we received a National Science Foundation grant to begin work on these questions. n17 Our study is the
most ambitious and comprehensive study of water transfers ever undertaken. It attempts to test basic economic theory
using an empirical study of water transfers in the American West.
In this Essay, we answer the first question: How much water marketing is taking place? n18 This Essay proceeds in
three steps. First, we set the context for water marketing with an overview of western water law that highlights unique
aspects of water law that affect how or whether a water market can develop. Second, we describe the methodology and
decision rules used to collect water transfer information. As will become clear, compiling a comprehensive dataset of
transfers in the American West was not always straightforward. We had to make several assumptions and apply rules of
thumb. Third, we present an overview and discussion of the compiled data. Finally, we identify water market trends and
movements to provide a greater understanding of the institutional structure and the mechanisms by which water is
transferred in the American West.
TEXT:
[*1025]
I. Western Water Law and Water Markets
A. Water rights
For a water market to develop, water law must securely establish rights to a particular quantity of water, and the rights
must be transferable. For most markets, such as computers or real estate, establishing secure property rights poses no
problem, as legal rules can easily set boundaries to protect essential characteristics of property, such as exclusivity.
Water has two complications that impede the development of a sophisticated market: water moves and water is reused.
Most water rights are only partially consumptive. For farmers who irrigate, crops typically consume thirty to fifty
percent of the water the farmer diverted from the river. n19 The other fifty to seventy percent usually flows off the land
and back into the river directly or percolates into the ground and moves subsurface, eventually rejoining the river
downstream. n20 Once the water has rejoined the stream, it is subject to second and subsequent diversions by
downstream users. n21 The important point for water marketing is that water rights are not exclusive, but
interdependent, so that a change in one user's method of irrigation, timing, or point of diversion might interfere with the
rights of downstream users who have come to rely on the upstream diverters' existing method of irrigation, timing of
irrigation, purpose of irrigation, or point of diversion.
[*1026]
B. State Policies and Water Rights
An important characteristic of water rights in most western states is that they are not absolute ownership rights but
instead usufructuary rights - rights to use the resource. Water is owned by the state that permits its citizens to make use
of the resource. n22 Water is thus a public resource regulated by the state that allows residents to use the water if they
put the water to a beneficial use. Most western states require the state's water agency to determine whether proposals for
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new diversions of surface water are in the "public interest." n23 Most states also have a regulatory review proceeding for
proposed transfers of water rights from one user to another or from one use to another that insures that the proposed
changes not harm other water rights holders. n24
Western water law, because it is largely state-based, may vary from state to state. For surface water rights, the prior
appropriation doctrine prevails in every western state. n25 This first-in-time is first-in-right rule divides diverters into
senior and junior appropriators depending on the date at which the first diversion was made. n26 The senior rights are
most secure, and during drought conditions, more junior users may be cut off. n27 Even though the system is heavily
regulated today through administrative agencies, its genesis in the nineteenth century means that anecdotal evidence
forms the basis for many of the most senior rights. While the prior appropriation doctrine is often understood as a
system that allots each user a fixed quantity of water with a particular priority date and a particular point of diversion
with a specified purpose, there are many conflicts between and among the large number of users on major western
rivers. Indeed in some states, claims by users exceed the amount of water that is actually in the river leading to the
curious dichotomy between "paper rights" and "wet water." n28
In an effort to eliminate this uncertainty and give more predictability to water rights, states have set up complicated
procedures, called general adjudications. General adjudications bring all claimants in a particular river system into a
single court to have [*1027] their competing claims sorted out and eventually adjudicated. n29 Once the adjudication is
complete, the court issues a decree specifying the respective water rights of all users. But for purposes of water
marketing, until such a decree establishes the nature of a particular water right, those interested in buying water rights
may be deterred because they are not exactly sure what they will be buying. In many western states, prior appropriators
have claims to water that have not been tested in court to determine whether the claims are valid and, even if valid, to
what quantity of water they are entitled. n30 Once adjudicated, the senior priority rights are the most secure and the most
sought after in water marketing. n31 Water rights are also less secure due to the principle in western water law that
requires all water to be used for a beneficial purpose. If the water is not used for such a purpose, the right may be
abandoned or forfeited. n32
If it is unclear whether a rancher has annually used the full amount of his water right, a cloud of uncertainty is cast
over the rancher's right. The beneficial use doctrine adds another impediment to the development of water markets. The
doctrine creates incentives for the rancher to use water in inefficient ways simply to rebut potential claims that he has
not used the water beneficially. These low-valued uses are the most likely candidates for transfers through water
marketing if the rancher can sell his unneeded water, which is a great uncertainty.
State law also controls rights to pump groundwater, and groundwater law has more variety between and among
western states than does surface water law. n33 For groundwater, some western states have a priority system that ranks
pumpers as junior or senior to each other, depending on when they commenced pumping, and some western states also
integrate the surface water priority system with the groundwater system, lending a measure of coherence and hydrologic
soundness to the legal system. n34 Other western states, including Arizona, California, and Texas, have no such [*1028]
integration. n35 In Texas, the law governing groundwater use is the right of capture - a right to pump a limitless amount
of water. n36 Arizona and California have adopted the reasonable use doctrine, which is an oxymoron. One may pump
an infinite quantity of water so long as the water is applied for a beneficial purpose, which is essentially any use. n37
These groundwater rules have two major problems, one environmental, the other economic. The environmental
consequence is that the failure to integrate ground and surface water has exposed our rivers to dewatering through the
invidious and indirect means of groundwater pumping. Pumping water that is hydrologically connected to surface flows
has done tremendous damage to rivers around the United States. n38 The economic consequence is that, although some
people think that these doctrines protect private property by recognizing the right of landowners to drill wells on their
property, on closer inspection, the doctrines offer no protection to the person who has drilled such a well. If an essential
characteristic of a property right is the ability to exclude others from using your property, then the right of capture and
reasonable use doctrines are not property rights at all. The right of capture and reasonable use doctrines epitomize what
Garrett Hardin calls the "tragedy of the commons" - limitless access to a common pool of resources. n39 These doctrines
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create an economic incentive to exploit the resource because each pumper obtains 100% of the benefits from her
pumping while the costs are spread among all who use the resource. This unrestricted system of access with its
incentives for overuse will eventually result in degradation and exhaustion of the resource. For water marketing
purposes, these groundwater doctrines impede a market from developing because no one who wishes to use
groundwater would ever pay another groundwater user for her rights, as the person could simply drill her own well.
Arizona, and to a lesser extent Texas, have begun to break this relentless cycle. n40
The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act ended the unfettered right to drill wells in the heavily populated
areas of the state, areas called active management areas. n41 New wells require a [*1029] permit from the state, and
perhaps, a demonstration that the developer has secured rights to a renewable water supply. n42 At the same time, the
Act grandfathered in protection for existing users, quantified their water rights, and most importantly, made their rights
transferable. n43 The Act put in place mechanisms by which a water market could potentially develop. In the 1990s,
however, the state took the wind out of the sails of a burgeoning market by creating the Central Arizona Groundwater
Replenishment District. n44 This organization is charged with obtaining access to renewable supplies to serve new
developments. n45 However, in practice, the system has functioned to remove the burden from developers to enter the
marketplace and secure water rights that would demonstrate an assured water supply as required under the Act. n46
Another factor that has impeded the development of markets is the seemingly innocent exemption from regulation
of wells for small domestic users. n47 The justification for the exemption is that the amount of water used by an
individual homeowner is de minimis to the state's regulatory system. n48 But in some states, tens or even hundreds of
thousands of exempt wells have been drilled in this fashion. n49 In the State of Washington, developers used multiple
exempt wells to furnish water to entire subdivisions. n50 The exemption for domestic wells finesses a demand that new
users enter the marketplace to acquire and retire an existing water right.
In most western states, water rights holders are theoretically free to transfer their rights for use by others upstream
or downstream on a river. n51 But the reality is more nuanced, particularly under the "no injury" rule that permits
transfers only so long as the transfer does not result in harm to other appropriators, including more junior appropriators.
n52 A transfer from one place on the river to another may have consequences for other users - third parties who are not
involved in the transaction between the seller and buyer of the water right. The factual complications involved in
assessing whether a junior has been harmed may substantially add to the [*1030] transaction costs, as it requires a fact
specific, intensive inquiry into return flows, irrigation ratio efficiencies, consumptive use patterns of various crops, and
the like.
One aspect of the legal system where there is a substantial difference across states is the salvaged water doctrine. If
a water user takes steps to use water more efficiently, such as by moving from flood to sprinkler irrigation or by lining
an earthen ditch with an impermeable material, should the appropriator obtain rights to the water that has been saved?
Common sense might dictate that the answer should obviously be "yes," as it encourages water conservation. But given
the "no injury" rule and the reality that downstream users may have come to rely on return flows, the case law and
legislation about salvaged water is far from uniform. The extreme is represented by Colorado, which prohibits water
users from clearing a channel as a basis for expanding the use of water by the appropriator. n53 The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the water saved became subject to the appropriation system and could then be used by the next most
senior appropriator, not by the person who undertook the water conservation efforts. n54 Other states, led by California,
encourage users to conserve water by giving the users the benefit of the water conserved. California law provides that
such conservation efforts will not be subject to the forfeiture doctrine and that the water conserved may be sold, leased,
or exchanged. n55
Another complicating feature involving the development of water markets is the question as to who owns the water
when it is used by farmers inside irrigation districts. Agricultural water supply organizations in the American West take
many forms: from community-based organizations, such as acequias in Northern New Mexico, to mutual water
companies in Colorado and Utah and to irrigation districts in most western states. n56 In mutual water companies, each
irrigator typically owns stock in the company, often called a "ditch" company. n57 Each share entitles the owner to a
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specified amount (or proportionate share) of water. All shares are equal, and because the ditch company controls the
rights - often to water diverted from a river but stored in a reservoir - the shares [*1031] are indistinguishable from one
another. This fungible quality reduces transaction costs and makes it extremely easy to transfer water between and
among members. In mutual companies, voting rights are by share: one share, one vote. In mutual companies, shares are
also transferable without the approval of the board. In Colorado, cities have recently found mutual shares worth
purchasing, we hypothesize, because their characteristics reduce objections from third-party juniors. n58
Irrigation districts, by contrast, are political subdivisions of the state with substantial powers, including the ability
to levy taxes, exercise the power of eminent domain, issue tax free bonds, and make rules and regulations for the
distribution of water within the district. n59 Irrigation districts play a critical role in the lives of all district residents and
the political power of these districts is unparalleled. Yet, quite surprisingly, voting rights in irrigation districts vary
tremendously. In some districts, any registered voter within the district may vote for the board of directors, but in other
districts only property owners may vote for the board. n60 Indeed, in some districts, a weighted system of voting gives
one vote per acre of land owned, thus allowing a handful of large farmers to control the election of the board. These
differences have substantial consequences for whether, and to what extent, an irrigation district is willing to engage in
water marketing for use outside the district by municipal and industrial interests. n61 In short, state law varies
tremendously, with some states facilitating the transfer of water from an irrigation district for use outside of a district
and other states, such as Arizona, granting the district veto power over such a transfer, regardless of the wishes of the
individual farmer who wants to sell the right to use his water. n62
C. The Role of Federal Law and Institutions in Encouraging or Discouraging Water Marketing
This portrait of western water law and water marketing would be incomplete without briefly considering the role of
federal law and institutions. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the dormant commerce clause
precluded states from [*1032] prohibiting out-of-state transfers of groundwater. n63 That decision paved the way for
interstate water sales and federal court challenges to efforts to restrict such sales. n64 Some states have attempted to use
Sporhase to limit the extent of out-of-state trading of its water. Other states, such as Montana, have established that
water leasing would be regulated by a state agency. n65 Efforts to restrict the export of water have taken many forms,
including recently in California county ordinances that prohibit the export of groundwater from within the county to
other regions of California. n66
Federal agricultural policy, with its massive subsidies, has encouraged the continuing inefficient use of water and
has served as a brake on water marketing. A 2006 Congressional Budget Office report documented how these policies
discourage the reallocation of water. n67 The federal government's agricultural marketing loan and price support
programs subsidize the production of crops and encourage the use of water for marginal crops that would not be grown
but for the subsidies. We think that the same thing might be said about subsidies for water infrastructure, low-cost
hydroelectric energy, and federal crop insurance. On the other hand, a recent federal program has encouraged water
conservation by irrigators. The Challenge Grant Program initiated by the Department of the Interior provides up to fifty
percent of the costs of irrigation efficiency improvements. n68
Three other aspects of federal law deserve mention. First, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has played a critical role
in providing water to farmers in the American West. n69 One hundred years after the creation of the Bureau, one might
think that courts would have settled the question of who owns the water that is provided through Bureau projects.
Instead, a controversy rages about the nature of those water rights. n70 In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case
that many observers hoped would settle the conflicting claims of farmers and the irrigation districts to which they
belong. n71 Orff v. United States involved California farmers who, [*1033] as members of the Westlands Water
District, claimed that, although they were not parties to the contract between the District and the Bureau, they could
enforce the contract as third-party beneficiaries. n72 The court ducked the issue by instead deciding the case on an issue
of sovereign immunity. n73 As a result, the extent to which farmers have property rights in Bureau water remains
unsettled and may turn on the contractual right they have with their individual districts and on the districts' contracts
with the federal government.
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Second, the Endangered Species Act [ESA] has encouraged the reallocation of water from agriculture to
environmental uses. The ESA not only prohibits the killing or destruction of a listed species but also the destruction of
critical habitat of the species. n74 Under the ESA, federal agencies must refrain from taking steps that would harm the
habitat of the species. n75 Several recent cases, including the highly publicized case of the Klamath River in southern
Oregon and northern California, have involved a decision of a federal agency to withhold water from farmers in an
irrigation district in order to protect a species of endangered salmon in the river below. n76 One controversial federal
claims court decision held that the decision of the agency was a taking of the property rights of the irrigators and
entitled them to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. n77 In contrast, another federal claims court decision held
that there was no taking of the property rights of irrigators in a district when the Bureau acted to protect an endangered
species. n78 Across the country, the ESA is requiring developers to engage in mitigation for filling in wetlands or
destroying critical habitat of listed species. Such mitigation often has required developers to purchase water rights,
especially in states such as Idaho and California. n79
Finally, if the federal government sets aside (reserves) federal land for a particular federal purpose, courts
frequently hold that the government intended to reserve water for the primary purpose [*1034] of the federal land. n80
The most important example of federal reserved water rights is for Indian reservations. The last thirty years has seen
many settlements of tribal water rights. These settlements have frequently been based on congressional enabling
legislation and financial support. The legislation has frequently addressed whether the Indian tribes can lease or sell the
water off their reservations and/or out of state. n81
In summary, a wide range of differences between and among the states as to water law, legal institutions, and the
presence of federal enclaves or Indian reservations significantly affects how and to what extent water marketing may
occur. With this background, we now turn to our data collection and the evidence regarding water markets.
III. The Methodology
We documented the annual water transfers that have occurred in the semi-arid West between 1987 and 2005. To collect
water transfer data, we used the Water Strategist ("WS"), a monthly publication that details transactions, litigation,
legislation, and other water marketing activities. n82 It is self-advertised as "the only source of published information on
water transactions in the West." n83 Each month, WS publishes a "Transactions" section that lists, by state, each water
transfer that occurred. n84 From the publication, we can learn all or some subset of the following: the year of the
transfer; the acquirer of the water; the supplier; the amount of water transferred; the proposed use of the water; and, if
applicable, the terms, such as the price, of the contract. In collecting data on water transfers, we recorded every transfer
in the WS from January 1987 through December 2005 in twelve western states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and Washington.
[*1035]
A. Transfer Classification
In order to analyze the transaction costs that impede the transfer of water from agricultural uses to uses outside of
agriculture, the most important variables for each transfer are the nature of the current use and of the proposed use.
Where is water coming from and where is it going? We developed three classifications of original use: An agricultural
use, an urban use, n85 or an environmental use. So, too, the destination of the water for the proposed use might be
agricultural, urban, or environmental. Because water can originate in one of three uses and can end up in one of three
uses, there are nine potential classifications for a transfer. n86
Figure 1 lists the various classifications of transfers in our dataset. We were primarily interested in the movement
of water from agricultural uses to uses outside of agriculture, which we defined as "agricultural to non-agricultural"
transfers. We lumped together all other transfers as "Other". These transfers consist of agricultural-to-agricultural
transfers; all transfers from urban uses; all transfers from environmental uses; and transfers involving multiple uses,
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which we labeled "Combination."
Figure 1
[SEE FIGURE 1 IN ORIGINAL]
[*1036] For the vast majority of transfers, WS explicitly indicated the original and the ultimate purpose of the water
and briefly described the details of each transaction. If WS did not explicitly note the nature of the original and ultimate
use, the brief description usually clarified the origination and destination uses. For a small number of transactions when
WS did not explicitly state the original and ultimate uses and the description of the transaction did not allow us easily to
decipher the nature of the uses, we developed rules-of-thumb for classifying the use when other information was sparse
or incomplete. n87
B. General Rules for Classifying Use of Water
By our rules-of-thumb, we classified a use as agricultural if the name of the lessor, lessee, seller, or buyer was an
irrigator, an irrigation district, an agricultural user, a farmer, a ranch, a canal company, a ditch company, or an
individual. n88 Similarly, we designated a use as agricultural if the description of the transaction stated that the water
was used in agriculture, if the water was provided by land fallowing, or if the description discussed widespread farming
in the district from which the water was supplied or sent.
We classified a party as an environmental user if it was a state department of fish and wildlife or a nature
conservancy. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, generally an agricultural water supplier, was classified as an
environmental user when it acted to improve or maintain instream flows, to help fish, to preserve water quality levels, or
engaged in other similar activities. When a party was a water conservation or conservancy district, we designated the
transfer as an agricultural, an urban, or a combination agriculture-and-urban exchange, not as environmental. Most
water conservation or conservancy districts are primarily involved in agricultural activities, [*1037] and some districts
have urban and/or a combination of agriculture and urban activities.
Lastly, we used rules-of-thumb to classify urban users when the WS either did not explicitly say what the water was
being used for or the description was too vague to determine the water's use. We classified as urban water used by
cities, townships, municipal water districts, developers, companies, golf course irrigators, landscape irrigators, or
mining companies.
Despite our attempts to develop classification rules that would reliably identify the nature of the parties, in some
cases, the information was simply incomplete. These "unknown" transfers, lacking a clear origin or destination, were
relatively rare, accounting for 85 (2.6%) of the 3317 transactions in our data set. They are not included in the tables
provided below. n89
Finally, a single transaction occasionally involved multiple transfers and different sectors. For example, an entry
might include an irrigator and a city that transferred a combined 10,000 acre-feet of water to another city. In this case,
the destination of the transfer is clearly to an urban use, but the origination came from agriculture and urban. In many
instances, the description included a breakdown that allowed us to identify the sectors. For example, if the irrigator and
city each transferred 5000 acre-feet, we noted two transactions, one of 5000 acre-feet from agriculture-to-urban and one
of 5000 acre-feet from urban-to-urban. In some cases, however, this information was not provided. We classified such
transfers as "combination" transfers because there was either a combination of origins or a combination of destinations.
Of the 3317 transfers in our dataset, 161 (4.9%) were combination transfers. n90
IV. The Results
A. Total Number and Volume of Transfers by Sector.
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The data in Table 1 provide a comprehensive description of water marketing in the West between 1987 and 2005.
[*1038]
Table 1
Water Transfers by Sector, 1987-2005
Classification Number Frequency Amount Frequency Committed Frequency
of of Water Amount of
Transfers (af)a Water (af)b
Agricultural 471 15% 7,138,480 23% 16,241,925 12%
to Agricultural
Agricultural 1,825 56% 5,533,394 18% 39,747584 29%
to Urban
Agricultural 233 7% 6,014,228 19% 18,186,143 13%
to
Environmental
Urban to 38 1% 326,440 1% 2,549,986 2%
Agricultural
Urban to Urban 440 14% 5,657,591 18% 26,600,020 19%
Urban to 54 2% 1,054,031 3% 8,925,447 6%
Environmental
Environmental 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
to Agricultural
Environmental 1 0% 62 0% 62 0%
to Urban
Environmental 6 0% 284,560 1% 4,171,200 3%
to
Environmental
Combination 164 5% 4,955,791 16% 21,636,938 16%
Total 3,232 100% 30,964,577 100% 138,059,303 100%
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
A Water flow during first year of contract as listed in Water Strategist.
B Total water committed by contract - one-year lease amounts and amounts implied by long-term leases and sales,
discounted to year of contract by five percent.
The data represent 3232 water transfers from 1987-2005. n91 Table 1 lists the amount of water transferred in each
classification in two ways. Column 3 lists the amount transferred in the first (or only) year of a contract; column 5 lists
the total amount of water committed over the full term of the sale or lease. n92 A number of important facts stand out.
First, agriculture is the source of most transferred water which is not surprising given that agriculture accounts for
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approximately eighty percent of consumptive use of water in the [*1039] West. As shown in Table 1, seventy-seven
percent of all exchanges and sixty percent of all water originates in agriculture. Agriculture-to-urban exchanges are the
most numerous, with fifty-six percent of transfers and eighteen percent of all water transferred, at 5,533,394 acre-feet.
Urban-to-environmental and combination exchanges also involve considerable amounts of water. Urban-to-agriculture,
environmental-to-agriculture, environmental-to-urban, and environmental-to-environmental exchanges are
comparatively unimportant.
There is considerable activity within sectors. Agriculture-to-agriculture exchanges account for fifteen percent of the
number of transactions and twenty-three percent of all water transferred. Urban-to-urban exchanges involve fourteen
percent of the number of transactions and eighteen percent of the amount of water traded. Most transferred water
remains in the same sector.
Environmental transactions (agriculture-to-environmental and urban-to-environmental) involve significant amounts
of water, 6,014,228 acre-feet and 1,054,031 acre-feet respectively. Based on descriptions provided in the WS, however,
these transfers are somewhat different in character from the others. These transactions generally are initiated by either
the federal or state governments, and as shown in Table 2, these transfers are the largest on average. Environmental
transactions are aimed at wetlands restoration, fish and wildlife habitat preservation or protection, and augmenting
stream flows. The most active parties are the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and state departments of fish and game. In
contrast, private parties, irrigators, and developers are more prevalent in agriculture-to-agriculture, agriculture-to-urban,
and urban-to-urban transactions.
The final and most important fact about Table 1 is the sheer scale of the volume of water. Transfers involved
almost thirty-one maf or roughly twice the annual flow of the Colorado River. If we focus on the cumulative effect of
all transfers, including sales and long-term leases, parties transacted for 138 maf, almost ten times the annual flow of the
Colorado. From this data, we can extrapolate that sales and long-term leases play an important role in
agriculture-to-urban transactions. n93 In contrast, agricultural-to-agricultural transactions tend to be one-year leases. n94
Table 2 outlines the average size of transfers for some of the major trading classifications in Table 1.
[*1040]
Table 2
Average Transaction Size
Classification Avg Transfer Volume Committed Avg Transfer Volume
(af)c (af)d
Agricultural to 15,156 34,484
Agricultural
Agricultural to Urban 3,032 21,780
Agricultural to 25,812 78,052
Environmental
Urban to Environmental 19,519 165,286
Urban to Urban 12,858 60,455
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
C Water flow first year of contract as listed in Water Strategist.
D Total water committed by contract.
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Environmental water transfers involve, on average, large volumes of water with agricultural-to-environmental
transfers over 25,000 acre-feet per transfer and urban-to-environmental transfers over 19,000 acre-feet.
Agricultural-to-agricultural and urban-to-urban transfers average 15,000 and 13,000 acre-feet respectively. The
numerous agricultural-to-urban transfers, however, tend to be quite small, averaging about 3000 acre-feet.
Understanding the nature and key issues surrounding water market activities provides some insight into this
phenomenon. Agricultural-to-urban transfers often involve the physical movement of water from an agricultural region
to an urban area. In the American West, water is power, wealth, and opportunity. The Owens Valley legacy has left
rural communities antagonistic toward cities that are coming after their water. n95 Furthermore, taking water out of
agriculture and putting it into urban uses involves third-party effects and transaction costs. As a result,
agricultural-to-urban transfers can become quite contentious. Obviously, the bigger the transfers are, the more likely
that third-parties will be affected and the more contentious the transaction becomes. Due to these endemic problems,
agricultural-to-urban transfers are generally small. Contention is less likely in agricultural-to-agricultural and
urban-to-urban transfers because these transfers are between fairly homogeneous parties. Nevetheless, [*1041] because
agricultural-to-urban transfers often involve long-term leases or sales, they commit a large volume of water. n96
Similarly, transfers from urban to environmental uses typically involve a permanent reallocation; as a result the
committed volume is almost nine times the average transfer volume. n97
B. Water Transfers over Time
Our dataset covers nineteen years from 1987 through 2005, and this time series allows us to examine how the water
market is changing over time, instead of simply providing a snapshot of the market at a given point in time. We had to
wrestle with the issue of how to measure the amount of water that was transferred in a given year. At first, this would
seem like a fairly easy task, but there are actually several different possible measurements. For example, suppose party
A leased 10,000 acre-feet of water to party B for five years starting in 1990. We could record this transaction as a single
transfer that occurred in 1990 and that transferred 10,000 acre-feet of water the first year of the contract, which for
one-year contracts is the total amount of water involved. Long-term contracts and sales, however, can involve
considerable flows of water over time. In our hypothetical, there was a transfer of 10,000 acre-feet each year, beginning
in 1990 through 1994. This water commitment is quite different than what the initial flow might suggest. To measure
this other amount, we projected the annual amounts forward for the length of the lease (or in perpetuity for sales) and
then discounted them by five percent to get a "committed" flow as of the year of the contract. Depending on how one
records this hypothetical transfer, one will get a different number of transfers, a different quantity of water transferred,
and different years when the transfer(s) took place. Is it more interesting to know the number of contracts made, the
annual amount contracted for, or the amount committed to be transferred over time? We decided that we wanted
answers to all three questions. We measured the number of transfers, the annual amounts of water, and the "committed"
amounts over time.
The need to distinguish between the two methodologies becomes clear when considering a sale of water rights as
opposed to a lease as in the above example. When a water right is sold, it is essentially a transfer that happens every
year in perpetuity. For [*1042] example, suppose party A sells a water right to 5000 acre-feet of water to party B in
1990. Again, there are two ways to measure this transfer. We could measure it as a transfer that took place in 1990 for
5000 acre-feet or as a transfer of 5000 acre-feet in 1990 and in each succeeding years in perpetuity and discount it back
to the transaction year, 1990. This measure, a much larger volume than 5000 acre-feet, is our committed amount
variable.
Figure 2
Number of Water Transfers, 1987-2005, With and Without Colorado
[SEE FIGURE 2 IN ORIGINAL]
Source: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
Figure 2 provides a graph of the number of transfers in each year for the western United States. Starting in 1987
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and moving toward 2005, we see a sharp increase in the number of transfers over time. More participants are becoming
involved in the market. However, the increasing trend has two distinct humps: one centered on 1994; the other around
1999. There was a decline in the number of transfers in the West between 1994 and 1999. Although our purpose in this
paper is to document, rather than explain the observed transfers, we can speculate as to the transfers' causes. One
explanation is that 1994 and 1999 were relatively dry years in the West in terms of the historical long-run average. n98
Hence, a [*1043] larger number of transfers take place in dry years and a smaller number in wet years. n99
Figure 2 presents the number of transfers with or without those from Colorado. Almost half of all transfers in the
twelve western states took place in one state - Colorado. The lion's share of these transfers involved the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project. n100 This trans-basin diversion of water from the West Slope is considered "developed" water,
which is subject to the total control of the developer. As such, the water may be sold or leased without the restriction of
the no-harm-to junior rule described above. Colorado-Big Thompson is a mutual water company, which uses shares to
represent the interests to water of its members. n101 An active market for these shares has developed because they have
a fungible quality that keeps down transaction costs. This example illustrates how important the reforms associated with
Colorado-Big Thompson's institutional structure are for promoting transfers.
C. Agricultural to Non-agricultural Transfers
Our research focuses on understanding how water moves from agricultural uses to non-agricultural uses and how the
law facilitates or hinders such transfers. Our agricultural to non-agricultural classification combines
agricultural-to-urban and agricultural-to-environmental transfers into one category. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that the
amount of water in this category has increased substantially and relatively steadily over time. Comparing years in the
late 1980s to years in the early 2000s reveals that the amount of water transferred has doubled.
[*1044]
Figure 3
Transfer Amounts, First Year of Contract, Agriculture-to-Non Agriculture, 1987-2005
[SEE FIGURE 3 IN ORIGINAL]
Figure 4
Transfer Amounts, Committed Water, Agriculture-to-Non Agriculture, 1987-2005
[SEE FIGURE 4 IN ORIGINAL]
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
Both Figures reveal increases in agricultural-to-agricultural uses over time. The committed quantity shows a less
pronounced trend because of the substantial amounts of water that are involved, especially with some transfers. n102
In summary, this data offers important observations about water marketing in the western United States. The
number of water [*1045] transfers, for the most part, has been growing. The amount of water transferred highly
correlates with the number of transfers and has generally increased over time.
D. Contract Types Used in Water Transfers
Understanding how water moves from one use to another requires an understanding of the contractual forms used by
the parties. Two primary contractual forms are leases and sales. In general, sales involve the permanent transfer of a
water right. Leases do not transfer the water right from one party to another. Leases transfer the water for a stated period
of time, but the right to the water remains in the original owner's hands. Leases have the potential to be of different
lengths. Certain entities may have an interest in obtaining water for a short period of time. Others may want to procure
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it for five years or longer. For example, in an area hit with particularly dry weather in a given year, a farmer with
avocado trees might save his investment (prevent his trees from dying) by leasing water from a neighboring farm that
grows alfalfa. If weather patterns improved the next year, there would be no need to lease water for more than one year.
Parties might use long-term leases when the acquiring party wished to purchase water rights but the transferor was only
willing to enter into a long-term lease. Some leases in the dataset were for as long as forty years. Most leases, however,
were for one year or less with relatively few more than one year in length.
Table 3
Water Transactions by Contract Type 1987-2005
[SEE TABLE 3 IN ORIGINAL]
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
Note: "Short-term Sales" as labeled in the Water Strategist are included with Short-term leases. There are relatively
few of them and [*1046] most occur in California. The entries in the Water Strategist describe the nature of the
contract, in this case, short-term sales.
E Water flow first year of contract, as listed in Water Strategist.
F Total water committed by contract.
G Miscellaneous transfers are listed as "exchanges" and "storages" in the Water Strategist. The entries in the Water
Strategist describe the nature of the transaction, and in this case, they are labeled as exchanges or storages and not sales
or leases. An example of an exchange would be a developer agreeing to give a portion of his water right to the city and
in exchange the city would allow the developer to connect his development to city utilities, such as a transfer for taps.
Another type of a miscellaneous contractual form is a storage whereby water is stored for future use. Of the 2323
transfers for which we were able to assign classifications eighty-five were neither sales nor leases and hence labeled as
miscellaneous contractual forms - exchanges and storages.
Table 3 details the number of leases in the dataset by length. Leases of all types account for thirty percent of
transactions and eighty-three percent of the water transferred. Short-term leases of a year or less were eighty percent of
all leases and ninety-two percent of all water leased.
The second primary form that a contract could take was a sale. Sales account for sixty-seven percent of all
transactions, but just thirteen percent of the water transferred. The miscellaneous transfers shown in Table 3 are those
that were not described in WS as either sales or leases. Examples of such transactions were exchanges of water between
parties for services and storage contracts. These transactions are not of major importance in water markets. These
transactions consisted of only three percent of the number of transfers and four percent of the amount of water
transferred.
Table 3 offers an important insight into the nature of western water markets. Most transactions (sixty-seven
percent) involve sales, but most water (eighty-three percent) is transferred by leases, usually (seventy-six percent)
short-term leases. We hypothesize that the legal impediments and political objections discussed in Section I have driven
market participants to use short-term leases to transfer large quantities of water precisely because such leases avoid high
transaction costs and finesse the controversial issue presented by a permanent reallocation of water from farmers to
cities.
[*1047]
Figure 5
Number of Transfers
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[SEE FIGURE 5 IN ORIGINAL]
Figure 6
Number of Transfers (CO omitted)
[SEE FIGURE 6 IN ORIGINAL]
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
For the entire data set, the number of sales is growing over time and is considerably larger than the number of
short-term and long-term leases. If we remove Colorado, and hence the Colorado-Big Thompson, then the number of
sales drops below the number of short-term leases, but this reflects the fact that large numbers of sales take place
routinely in Colorado-Big Thompson. However, the Colorado-Big Thompson sales are for small quantities. Figures 7
and 8 show "committed" water over time by category.
[*1048]
Figure 7
Amount of Water Committed
[SEE FIGURE 7 IN ORIGINAL]
Figure 8
Amount of Water Committed (CO Omitted)
[SEE FIGURE 8 IN ORIGINAL]
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
With or without Colorado, the amount of water committed by sales and long-term leases is growing over time. In
Colorado-Big Thompson, there are many small sales so that the amount committed is limited. The small size of the
sales explains why leaving Colorado out has little effect, but it is important to point out. Focusing just on the number of
sales would lead to the conclusion that sales are not growing relatively to leases when Colorado is removed, but one
would not want to conclude that sales or long-term leases are not important. These sales and long-term leases obligate
[*1049] substantial amounts of water, suggesting that water markets are expanding in terms of quantities.
E. Contract Types over Time
Table 4 lists the number of transfers for each year as short-term leases, long-term leases, and sales. As in the aggregate
data, sales are the most common form of contract, but they involve less water than short-term leases. The number of
sales has sharply increased over time; in 1988, there were seventy-nine sales, but by 2005, there were 146, an increase
of eighty-five percent. Long-term leases also are more prevalent. Short-term leases reveal a more modest upward trend.
The amounts of water transferred by sales and long-term leases have dramatically increased. However, short-term leases
account for the most water transferred each year by far, and there is considerable fluctuation, reflecting precipitation
levels and other factors.
Table 4
Annual Water Transfers by Contract Type and Amount
Number Amount
of Trans-
Trans- ferred
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fers Short- Long- Sales Total Short- Long- Sales Total
Term Term Term Term
Leases Leases Leases Leases
1987 6 3 79 88 101,150 1,708 152,674 172,532
1988 15 2 61 77 427,397 24 143,125 448,506
1989 19 7 63 90 454,949 9,002 404,773 778,877
1990 33 6 95 140 1,771,939 27,308 23,304 1,890,082
1991 55 6 87 156 2,359,150 30,750 129,102 2,526,601
1992 40 6 106 154 1,537,700 66,260 95,428 1,723,940
1993 37 11 126 182 1,271,042 177,463 87,867 1,778,591
1994 77 2 131 186 2,554,645 319 49,760 2,421,850
1995 49 2 120 161 2,306,035 6,975 85,761 897,128
1996 22 7 94 117 370,360 19,218 179,735 1,257,717
1997 42 8 80 140 1,123,214 84,274 54,471 1,347,735
1998 31 17 104 155 340,672 187,351 258,417 847,906
1999 70 25 139 238 887,409 487,654 429,508 1,836,965
2000 51 11 152 216 2,465,434 57,918 106,852 2,654,762
2001 48 19 135 202 1,036,533 154,590 318,554 1,359,453
2002 46 17 140 205 1,118,980 173,841 508,848 1,887,212
2003 51 17 157 233 1,097,708 368,813 172,253 1,626,580
2004 44 10 150 207 1,540,868 52,000 374,868 1,978,477
2005 52 17 146 209 993,117 182,107 399,508 1,755,100
Total 788 193 2,165 3,156 23,758,304 2,087,575 3,974,808 29,190,014
[*1050] Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
F. Analysis of Water Marketing by State
Tables 5 and 6 provide a detailed description of all transfers from agriculture or urban in each of the western states. The
tables show the relative percentages of the amount of water exchanged by origination and destination classifications in a
single state, in annual amounts and in committed quantities. For example, in Arizona fifteen percent of the water
transferred was in agriculture-to-urban trades, while forty-five percent and thirty-nine percent were part of
agriculture-to-agriculture and urban-to-urban trades. n103 There were no environmental transactions.
The data allows for informative interstate comparison. From Tables 5 and 6, one is able to determine the types of
transfers that dominated in each of the states. For instance, Montana and Idaho were most active in transferring water
from agricultural-to-environmental uses; Arizona in agricultural-to-agricultural transfers; and Colorado, Nevada, Texas,
and Utah in agricultural-to-urban transfers. Some states had a variety of transactions, notably, California, Colorado, and
Washington.
Table 5
Share of Each Transfer Classification to a State's Total Transfer Amount (af), 1987-2005, Annual Flows
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Ag to Ag to Ag to Urban to Urban Urban to Combination Acre-feet
Urban Envir Ag Urban to Ag Envir
AZ 15% 0% 45% 39% 0% 0% 0% 8,375,769
CA 19% 25% 15% 12% 1% 4% 24% 11,058,161
CO 25% 19% 15% 10% 5% 4% 7% 1,221,523
ID 12% 45% 18% 2% 0% 0% 22% 4,960,527
MT 19% 64% 16% 0% 0% 0% 1% 67,802
NM 3% 20% 16% 1% 26% 30% 1% 512,134
NV 63% 18% 0% 12% 0% 0% 8% 289,563
OR 0% 43% 10% 0% 0% 39% 8% 954,314
TX 33% 1% 10% 26% 0% 0% 31% 2,559,141
UT 33% 0% 27% 25% 0% 0% 15% 366,577
WA 25% 25% 18% 7% 0% 24% 0% 318,619
WY 13% 0% 22% 0% 1% 0% 64% 280,449
[*1051] Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap data set.
Table 6
Share of Each Transfer Classification to a State's Total Transfer Amount (af), 1987-2005, Committed Quantities
Ag to Ag to Ag to Urban to Urban Urban to Combination Acre-feet
Urban Envir Ag Urban to Ag Envir
AZ 31% 0% 37% 32% 0% 0% 0% 21,889,596
CA 25% 13% 11% 10% 4% 2% 34% 36,811,579
CO 30% 29% 3% 7% 1% 1% 4% 14,913,506
ID 8% 56% 19% 1% 1% 1% 13% 8,263,996
MT 42% 53% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 492,012
NM 14% 9% 21% 4% 33% 18% 0% 2,350,967
NV 44% 26% 0% 17% 0% 0% 12% 3,879,418
OR 0% 30% 3% 0% 0% 66% 1% 8,841,279
TX 41% 0% 3% 38% 0% 0% 18% 31,144,987
UT 43% 0% 3% 36% 0% 0% 19% 5,004,915
WA 39% 10% 2% 9% 0% 40% 1% 3,917,912
WY 24% 1% 39% 0% 8% 0% 28% 643,874
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker and Libecap data set.
Tables 7 and 8 provide a different cross-state comparison by indicating how much each state contributed to the total
amount of water transferred within each classification in all states, in annual amounts and in committed quantities. For
example, of the total amount of water transferred from agricultural uses to urban uses, Arizona transferred twenty-three
percent of that water, and California transferred thirty-eight percent. As before, there is considerable variation across the
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states. Arizona accounts for fifty-three percent and fifty-eight percent, respectively, of all agriculture-to-agriculture and
urban-to-urban water transactions. California and Idaho contribute most of the agriculture-to-environmental transfer
amounts. Lastly, very little water marketing occurs in Montana, Nevada, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, regardless
of transfer classification.
[*1052]
Table 7
Relative Percentage of State to each Classification's Total Transfer Amount (af), 1987-2005, Annual Flows
Ag to Ag to Ag to Urban to Urban Urban to Combination
Urban Envir Ag Urban to Ag Envir
AZ 23% 0% 53% 58% 0% 0% 0%
CA 38% 46% 23% 24% 39% 38% 53%
CO 5% 4% 2% 2% 18% 5% 2%
ID 11% 38% 12% 2% 1% 1% 22%
MT 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NM 0% 2% 1% 0% 41% 14% 0%
NV 3% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
OR 0% 7% 1% 0% 0% 35% 1%
TX 15% 0% 4% 12% 0% 0% 16%
UT 2% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1%
WA 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 7% 0%
WY 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 4%
Acre 5,533,394 6,014,228 7,138,481 5,657,592 326,440 1,054,031 4,955,791
Feet
Source: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, Libecap data set.
Table 8
Relative Percentage of State to each Classification's Total Transfer Amount (af), 1987-2005, Committed Quantities
Ag to Ag to Ag to Ag Urban to Urban Urban to Combi-
Urban Envir Urban to Ag Envir nation
AZ 17% 0% 49% 26% 0% 0% 0%
CA 23% 26% 25% 14% 62% 10% 58%
CO 11% 23% 3% 4% 3% 1% 3%
ID 2% 25% 10% 0% 2% 1% 5%
MT 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NM 1% 1% 3% 0% 30% 5% 0%
NV 4% 6% 0% 3% 0% 0% 2%
OR 0% 14% 2% 0% 0% 66% 0%
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TX 32% 0% 5% 44% 0% 0% 27%
UT 5% 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 4%
WA 4% 2% 0% 1% 0% 17% 0%
WY 0% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 1%
Acre 39,758,591 18,186,143 16,241,926 26,634,114 2,549,986 8,925,447 21,686,569
Feet
Sources: Water Strategist and Brewer, Glennon, Ker, Libecap data set.
[*1053]
Conclusion
With rapid urban growth, water is becoming increasingly scarce in the West. As a result, cities are searching for water
from new sources. This Essay presented the legal context within which marketing occurs, described the methodology
used to collect and classify the data, and analyzed the trends in the water market for twelve states in the semi-arid west
from 1987-2005. As for the data, the number of water transfers and the amount of water transferred highly correlate
over time. However, when we break these transfers down into various components, we note that the number of transfers
and the amount of water transferred vary greatly. We find that most transfers are agricultural-to-non-agricultural, yet
most water is transferred from agricultural-to-agricultural and from urban-to-urban. We also find that, although most
transfers are sales, most water is transferred via short-term leases. Finally, although most transfers are permanent, most
water is transferred on a temporary basis.
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
GovernmentsAgriculture & FoodProduct PromotionGovernmentsState & Territorial GovernmentsWater RightsReal
Property LawWater RightsGeneral Overview
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n51. See A. Dan Tarlock et al., Water Resource Management: A Casebook in Law and Public Policy 357 (5th ed. 2002).
n52. See Sax et al., supra note 4, at 270-76.
n53. See S.E. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1326-27 (Colo. 1974).
n54. The Colorado Legislature has approved this result. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-90-103, 37-92-103(9) (2006). See generally Eli Feldman,
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n68. See id. at 16 n.50. The CBO Report applauds these federal cost-sharing programs but suggests that they might be even more effective if
they targeted larger farms. Id. at 18.
n69. See Sax et al., supra note 4, at 687-88.
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n77. See Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 313.
n78. See Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 505.
n79. See, e.g., Land and Money Mitigation Requirements in Endangered Species Act Enforcement: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Resources, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1999) (statement of Richard W. Pombo, Member, House Comm. on Resources), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/resources/hii58723.000/hii58723_0f.htm.
n80. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
n81. See generally Bonnie G. Colby et al., Negotiating Tribal Water Rights 171-76 (2005) (explanatory parenthetical); Robert Glennon,
Coattails of the Past: Using and Financing the Central Arizona Project, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 677, 733-43 (1995).
n82. Water Strategist, http://www.waterstrategist.com/.
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n86. The nine classifications of transfers are: agricultural-to-agricultural, agricultural-to-urban, agricultural-to-environmental,
urban-to-agricultural, urban-to-urban, urban-to-environmental, environmental-to-agricultural, environmental-to-urban, and
environmental-to-environmental.
n87. In select cases where the description of the transfer contained in the Water Strategist was ambiguous, we relied on Robert Glennon's
knowledge of water institutions in the West (informed by Google searches). These transfers primarily occurred in Arizona and California
and consisted of approximately fifty-five of the 3317 transfers in the dataset.
n88. One could potentially argue that an individual should be classified as an urban user instead of an agricultural user, but we concluded
that it was far more probable that an individual - not a city, a corporation, or another institution reflecting municipal or industrial use - was
an agricultural user. This rule-of-thumb seemed especially sensible as most "individuals" were sellers of water. Individuals, we decided,
were most likely farmers. The Water Strategist described the seller of water as an individual eighty-eight times and the buyer nine times. The
total water that was transferred when either the buyer or the seller was listed as an individual was 22,467 acre-feet. This amount is less than
one one-hundredth of a percent of the total water transferred in our dataset. One transfer by an individual accounted for 15,000 acre-feet of
the 22,467 acre-feet transferred.
n89. These unknown transfers account for 798,932 acre-feet of water, about 2.5% of the total in our dataset.
n90. Combination transfers account for 4,939,997 acre-feet, about 15.5% of the total in our dataset.
n91. As noted above, we identified 3317 water transfers between 1987 and 2005. However, eighty-five transactions did not have enough
complete information for us to include in the analysis, leaving 3232 observations. See Jedidiah Brewer, Robert Glennon, Alan Ker & Gary
Libecap, Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual Forms Extent: Property Rights, and Regulatory Issues 1987-2005,
Economic Inquiry, (forthcoming 2007) (providing a more technical discussion).
n92. This is discounted to the year of the contract by five percent. We discuss the basis for this committed category in more detail below.
n93. The committed amount of water in the agricultural-to-urban category is almost eight times the first-year flow. Compare column 5, line
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n94. Column 5, line 1 is only slightly more than double column 3, line 1.
n95. See Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water 61-87 (1986). But see Gary Libecap, Owens
Valley Revisited: A Reassessment of the West's First Great Water Transfer (forthcoming 2007). Owens Valley was the first large-scale
water transfer in the West from agriculture to urban uses. It made the growth of semi-arid Los Angeles possible, but its legacy is one of the
mistrust of water markets. See Brent M. Haddad, Rivers of Gold: Designing Markets to Allocate Water in California xv (2000).
n96. Compare column 2, line 2 with column 1, line 2.
n97. Compare column 1, line 4 with column 2, line 4.
n98. The years between 1994 and 1999 were relatively wet years. National Climatic Data Center, U.S. Climate at a Glance,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/cag3.html.
n99. A simple correlation of California precipitation data and water transfers in California from 1987 to 2005 is -0.185. The correlation of
lagged precipitation and water transfers is -0.239. These measures suggest that transfers and precipitation move opposite of one another, as
we would expect. Because we are not controlling for any other factors, the correlations are fairly strong evidence of this relationship.
n100. See Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and
Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41 Nat. Resources J. 283, 283-328 (2001) (discussing the importance of the Colorado Big Thompson
Project).
n101. See Daniel Tyler, The Last Water Hole in the West: The Colorado-Big Thompson Project and the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District 456-61 (1992) (describing the structure of the Colorado-Big Thompson).
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n102. Notice the difference in the scale for the committed relative to the annual flow. Water markets, however, are expanding in terms of
quantities.
n103. The residual classification is made up of environmental-to-agricultural, environmental-to-urban, and environmental-to-environmental
transfers.
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